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Abstract
This longitudinal study explored the relations between fear-enhancing parenting behaviors (modeling and threat information 
transmission) and children’s cognitive biases and anxiety symptoms on three subsequent time points over a one-year period. 
Participants were 216 children aged 7–12 years (114 boys and 102 girls), and their mothers (n = 199) and/or fathers (n = 117). 
On each time point, children and parents completed the Parental Enhancement of Anxious Cognitions scale, which measures 
parental modeling and threat information transmission. Furthermore, children filled in a measure of anxiety disorder symp-
toms. In addition, confirmation bias and interpretation bias were measured by means of a number of computerized tasks. The 
results yielded support for a circular model in which cognitive biases enhanced anxiety symptoms, which in turn promoted 
cognitive biases on each of the three time points. However, no evidence was found for longitudinal effects of cognitive biases 
on anxiety or vice versa. In contrast to what we expected, cognitive biases and anxiety appeared to promote parental modeling 
and threat information rather than the other way around. These findings extend research on the relations between parenting 
behaviors, cognitive biases, and childhood anxiety symptoms, and suggest valuable leads for assessment and intervention.
Keywords Children’s anxiety symptoms · Cognitive biases · Parenting · Modeling · Threat information transmission.
Epidemiological studies show that anxiety disorders are 
among the most common mental disorders in childhood 
[1–3]. Given their high prevalence rates, research on the 
etiology and maintenance of anxiety disorders in children 
and adolescents is important and it is good to see that in 
previous decades considerable advancements have been 
made in our understanding of the factors involved in the 
pathogenesis of this type of psychopathology (see reviews 
by [4, 5]). According to Beck’s [6] cognitive theory, infor-
mation processing biases play an important role, and there 
is indeed evidence showing that these biases are involved in 
the maintenance and exacerbation of anxiety problems [7]. 
It is also known that anxiety-related cognitive biases not 
only occur in adults but are also present in children [8, 9].
Anxiety-related cognitive biases are concerned with 
overactive schemas involving the themes of threat and 
danger [7], which manifest themselves as cognitive dis-
tortions that occur during subsequent stages of information 
processing [10]. In the early stages, where information 
about the internal or external world is automatically per-
ceived and encoded, anxious individuals display a typi-
cal tendency to shift their attention towards threatening 
stimuli (i.e., attentional bias). During later stages, informa-
tion is consciously interpreted and transformed into action 
tendencies and actual behavior. Two types of cognitive 
biases in these later stages have our special interest in the 
present investigation. The first one is interpretation bias, 
which can be defined as the tendency to interpret ambigu-
ous stimuli and situations as threatening [11]. The most 
widely used method for assessing this type of bias is the 
ambiguous vignette paradigm, which makes use of a series 
of short descriptions of everyday situations that may occur 
in daily life. Children are asked to score the perceived 
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level of threat or indicate how they would respond in such 
situations. From both types of responses one can reliably 
infer whether children interpret the ambiguous scenarios 
as dangerous, a tendency that has been demonstrated to 
be present in high-anxious non-referred children [12–14] 
as well as in children with anxiety disorders [15, 16]. The 
second cognitive distortion is confirmation bias, which 
refers to the selective search for information that concurs 
with the view that one holds, while ignoring information 
that might disconfirm this view [11]. A paradigm that 
is often employed to investigate confirmation bias is a 
task in which children are given the opportunity to select 
additional, negative or positive information about a novel 
(potentially) threatening stimulus (often an unknown ani-
mal) or situation. It has been shown that anxious chil-
dren display a stronger tendency to search for negative 
information and less frequently tend to choose positive 
information, indicating the presence of a confirmation bias 
[17–20].
Like other psychopathological phenomena, the origins 
of anxiety-related cognitive biases are assumed to be due 
to genetic and environmental factors, which also interact 
with each other [8]. There is evidence showing that cogni-
tive biases occurring during the early stages of information 
processing (i.e., attentional biases) are more clearly associ-
ated with genetic factors such as an inherited liability in the 
serotonin-transporter gene [21, 22]. Meanwhile, the contri-
bution of heritability to anxiety-related distortions that take 
place during the later stages of processing (such as inter-
pretation bias and confirmation bias) has been shown to be 
quite modest [23]. For these biases, it seems more plausible 
to investigate the role of environmental factors, of which 
familial influences such as parenting can be considered as 
especially relevant. Murray, Creswell, and Cooper [24] have 
outlined a cognitive-behavioral model in which parents’ 
distorted cognitions (e.g., threat interpretation bias) and in 
its wake expectations of the child (about how well it can 
control or cope with [potentially] dangerous situations) fuel 
fear-enhancing parenting behaviors such as modeling (i.e., 
a parent showing fear and anxiety reactions in the presence 
of the child [25]) and verbal threat information transmission 
(i.e., a parent verbally expressing to the child that a stimulus 
or situation might be dangerous [26]), which ultimately will 
install anxious information processing biases in the child 
(see also [27]).
The support for a scenario in which parenting behaviors 
promote cognitive biases and subsequent anxiety symptoms 
in children has been mainly circumstantial [28]. That is, 
research so far demonstrated that: (1) anxious parents have 
anxious children [29]; (2) anxious parents display threat-
related cognitive biases that tend to generalize to their child’s 
environment [30] and that may also install similar cognitive 
biases in offspring [31]; and (3) the parenting behaviors of 
modeling and verbal threat information transmission are 
involved in the transfer of anxiety and threat-related biases 
from parents to children [32, 33].
Attempts to investigate the relations among parenting, 
cognitive bias, and anxiety in children in one and the same 
study are relatively sparse. One exception is an investiga-
tion by Barrett et al. [34] who assessed interpretation bias 
in anxious youths aged 7–14 years and explored how family 
processes influenced children’s interpretations of ambiguity. 
Clinically referred children with anxiety disorders (n = 152), 
children with externalizing problems (i.e., oppositional-
defiant disorder; n = 27), and non-clinical control children 
without any problems (n = 26) and their parents were asked 
separately to interpret and provide action plans for a series 
of ambiguous scenarios. Following this initial assessment, 
children and parents were asked to discuss a number of 
these scenarios together, after which children were invited 
to provide a final response for each of the scenarios. The 
results indicated that the anxious and aggressive children 
were both more likely to interpret the ambiguous scenarios 
in a threatening way as compared to the non-clinical control 
group, with anxious children more often choosing avoid-
ant action plans and oppositional-defiant children more fre-
quently selecting aggressive solutions. Most importantly, 
the family discussions strengthened this pattern of results, 
showing significant increases in anxious children’s avoidant 
action plans and oppositional-defiant children’s aggressive 
action plans. Although these findings are relevant for multi-
ple types of psychopathology, they clearly demonstrate that 
in the case of anxiety problems, a threat-related cognitive 
style may develop within the context of anxiety-enhancing 
family processes.
A recent study by Sicouri et al. [35] used a similar proce-
dure to explore the relations between parent–child discus-
sions, cognitive bias, and anxiety in children with asthma. 
Eighty-nine parent–child dyads were included across four 
groups: children with asthma and anxiety (n = 29), chil-
dren with anxiety only (n = 21), children with asthma only 
(n = 15), and healthy control children (n = 24), all aged 
between 8 and 13 years. Interpretation bias was measured 
using two types of scenarios related to general threat and 
asthma threat. It was found that children with anxiety dis-
played an interpretation bias in response to the general threat 
scenarios, whereas children with asthma exhibited an inter-
pretation bias in response to the asthma threat scenarios. 
Most interestingly, following parent–child discussions, 
changes in avoidance reactions were noted, and these mainly 
occurred in the anxious children in response to asthma threat 
scenarios.
Another study was conducted by Remmerswaal, Muris, 
and Huijding [36] who explored the role of parents in the 
development of a cognitive bias and subsequent fear levels 
in non-clinical children aged between 8 and 13 years who 
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were confronted with a novel animal. More precisely, in 
two experiments (N’s being 122 and 49), it was examined 
whether instructed (experiment 1) or spontaneous (experi-
ment 2) verbal feedback of mothers induced a negative 
information search strategy (i.e., confirmation bias) in their 
offspring. The results convincingly demonstrated that the 
verbal feedback of the mothers (either provided on instruc-
tion or given spontaneously—based on their own cognitive 
distortion) had a significant impact on children’s cognitive 
bias. More precisely, when mothers verbally encouraged 
their offspring to search for threat-related information about 
the animal, children indeed displayed a stronger confirma-
tion bias, which subsequently also resulted in increased 
fear for the unknown animal. Again, this can be taken as 
supportive evidence for the role of parenting variables in 
the intergenerational transmission of cognitive biases from 
mothers to children [36].
In further research by Van Niekerk et al. [37], anxiety-
related interpretation biases were measured in 7- to 14-year-
old children of whom the parents were diagnosed with 
panic disorder (PD; n = 44), social anxiety disorder (SAD; 
n = 27), comorbid PD and SAD (n = 7), or of whom par-
ents did not suffer from an anxiety disorder at all (n = 84). 
A set of ambiguous scenarios with a panic or social threat 
content was used, which had to be interpreted by the chil-
dren under two conditions: first without priming and one 
week later with priming (i.e., viewing a video of an adult 
telling what it is like to have a specific anxiety disorder). 
The results indicated that in general children’s own level 
of anxiety symptoms was predictive of interpretation bias 
scores. Parental anxiety diagnosis also played a significant 
role: more precisely, it was found that children of parents 
with PD, but not the offspring of parents with SAD, dis-
played a stronger tendency to interpret ambiguous scenarios 
in a more negative way as compared to children of parents 
without anxiety disorders. Priming appeared not to have a 
significant impact on children’s interpretation of the sce-
narios. A similar study by Schneider, Unnewehr, Florin, and 
Margraf [38], which was conducted more than 15 years ear-
lier, compared 29 children of parents with PD, 21 children 
of parents with animal phobias, and 30 children of parents 
without a mental disorder (all children were between 8 and 
15 years old). Findings revealed that children of parents with 
PD, but not those of parents with animal phobia or healthy 
control parents, showed an increase in anxious interpreta-
tions, although in this study the effect could only be demon-
strated when children had been primed with a panic-relevant 
model. Although the priming procedure used in both stud-
ies [37, 38] certainly bears resemblance to the modeling 
and verbal threat transmission phenomena that have been 
described earlier, it should be borne in mind that the use 
of a video model makes these investigations less relevant if 
one wants to gain insight in the family processes underlying 
the transfer of cognitive biases and anxiety from parents to 
children. Nevertheless, the findings do confirm that there are 
significant links between parental anxiety (especially in case 
symptoms are clearly noticeable as in PD) and children’s 
cognitive biases and anxiety symptoms.
While the studies by Barrett et al. [34], Schneider et al. 
[38], Remmerswaal et al. [36], Sicouri et al. [35], and Van 
Niekerk et al. [37] were all to some extent experimental 
in nature, Fliek et al. [39] relied on a different research 
approach. They conducted a cross-sectional survey to 
examine the relations between parenting, cognitive bias, 
and anxiety symptoms in a sample of 258 children aged 
7 to 12 years. Interestingly, the fear-promoting parenting 
behaviors of modeling and threat information transmission 
were both measured by means of a specifically construed 
scale in fathers as well as mothers. Further, children’s cogni-
tive distortions of interpretation bias and confirmation bias 
and DSM-defined anxiety disorder symptoms were also 
assessed. The results indicated that both types of cognitive 
biases mediated the relationship between threat information 
transmission (of both parents) and children’s anxiety symp-
toms, while only interpretation bias significantly mediated 
the relationship between modeling (of mothers) and chil-
dren’s anxiety symptoms.
The data of the Fliek et al. [39] study were collected as 
part of a longitudinal study on the relations between cogni-
tive biases, anxiety disorder symptoms, and family factors 
that might influence the relation between these variables. 
Follow-up assessments have now been conducted in this 
sample of children on two further time points (i.e., after 
6 and 12 months) and these data will be included in the 
present study, so that it becomes possible to investigate the 
relations among fear-enhancing parenting, cognitive bias, 
and anxiety symptoms in children longitudinally. Thus, the 
fear-enhancing parental variables of modeling and verbal 
threat information transmission, the two types of cogni-
tive biases: interpretation bias and confirmation bias, and 
anxiety symptoms were measured in 258 children aged 7 to 
12 years on three occasions. The data were used to test the 
following hypotheses: First of all, with regard to the rela-
tions between cognitive biases and children’s anxiety symp-
toms on a cross-sectional level, we predicted to find support 
for a bidirectional (circular) model [17] in which cognitive 
biases promote anxiety symptoms, and anxiety symptoms 
in turn enhance cognitive biases. Second, we expected that 
children’s cognitive biases and anxiety symptoms would be 
stable over time. A third hypothesis concerned longitudinal 
effects, and implied that cognitive biases would enhance 
children’s anxiety symptoms on subsequent time points, 
which of course would substantiate the idea that these dis-
tortions are involved in the maintenance and exacerbation 
of anxiety problems [6, 7], but also that anxiety problems 
would promote cognitive distortions over time, which is in 
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keeping with the abovementioned bi-directional model. As 
a fourth hypothesis, we predicted that detrimental parent-
ing behaviors would lead to more cognitive distortions and 
higher anxiety levels, both on a cross-sectional and on a 
longitudinal level. Fifth and finally, based on the most cur-
rent theoretical notions and the findings of previous studies 
[28, 34, 36, 39], we expected to find support for a longitudi-
nal mediational model in which the cognitive distortions of 
interpretation bias and confirmation bias mediate the rela-
tion between the parenting behaviors of modeling and threat 
information transmission on the one hand, and children’s 
anxiety symptoms on the other hand.
With regard to the cross-sectional and longitudinal model 
testing, it is important to note the current data were also used 
to test a number of (plausible) alternative models, since it 
should not only be proven that a hypothesized model fits the 
data well, but also that it fits better than alternative mod-
els. For instance, we examined the fit of models in which 
both biases were correlated versus models in which one bias 
affected the other, and a model in which anxiety symptoms 
and both cognitive biases were all correlated to each other 
versus models with bias affecting anxiety or vice versa. Fur-
ther, in our exploration of parental influences, we also tested 
a model in which anxiety symptoms and cognitive biases 
promoted detrimental parenting, as there is some evidence 
in the literature that when children are highly anxious, their 
parents become more overprotective (and thus likely show 
modeling and threat information transmission) [40].
Method
Participants
At the beginning of the study, the sample consisted of 258 
non-clinical children (132 boys and 126 girls) aged between 
7 and 12 years (M = 9.52, SD = 1.38). All children had the 
Dutch nationality and the majority of them were Caucasian 
(> 95%). The remainder of the families originated from 
diverse ethnic backgrounds (e.g., North African, Arabic, 
Asian). Questionnaires about parental behaviors nearly 
always referred to children’s biological parents; the two 
exceptions being one child who had adoptive parents and one 
child who was raised by his mother and her female partner. 
The latter child only answered the questions with regard to 
the biological mother. About 15% of the children came from 
divorced families. For the ultimate analysis, we only used 
those cases for which we had complete child data on each 
of the three time points. More precisely, on the second time 
point, four children dropped out, whereas on the third time 
point, another 38 children dropped out, and as a result the 
final sample of participants consisted of 216 children (114 
boys and 102 girls). Independent-samples t-tests revealed 
that children who dropped out (M = 10.99, SD = 1.07) 
were significantly older than children who did not drop out 
(M = 9.69, SD = 1.14; t(256) = 6.76, p < .001), whereas they 
did not differ significantly with regard to anxiety, both types 
of cognitive biases (all t(256)’s < 1, p’s > 0.05), and gender 
(χ2(1) = 1.12, p > 0.05) as measured at baseline.1
Parents were also asked to fill out the questionnaire 
measuring modeling and threat information transmission. 
A total of 199 mothers and 117 fathers (mean ages being 
42.20 years, SD = 4.42 and 44.36 years, SD = 4.95, respec-
tively, range 28–65 years) did so on the first time point of 
this study. On the second time point, 18% of mothers and 
14% of fathers dropped out. On the third time point, another 
6% of mothers as well as 6% of fathers dropped out. Inde-
pendent-samples t-tests revealed no significant differences 
between parents who dropped out and parents who did not 
drop out for any of the child and parent variables that were 
assessed in this study (all t(df)’s ≤ 1.98, p’s > 0.05), where df 
varied from 79 to 174 depending on the variable for which 
dropouts were compared to non-dropouts, and depending on 
the different sample sizes for mothers and fathers. For the 
statistical analyses of the parent data, we only used those 
cases for which we had obtained data on all three time points 
(N = 147). For 43 children only the mother completed all 
three assessments. For three children only the father com-
pleted the three assessments. For a total of 44 children, the 
three assessments were completed alternately by either the 
mother or the father. For the remaining 57 children, both par-
ents completed all three assessments and their scores were 
averaged for the final data analysis. As compensation for 
their participation, families, for whom children and parents 
had completed questionnaires on all three assessment points, 
received a set of cinema vouchers (which each had a value 
of 7.50 Euro).
Measures
The parental enhancement of anxious cognitions (PEAC) 
was used to assess parental modeling and threat informa-
tion transmission behaviors. The scale was construed for 
the purpose of this research project [39]. The PEAC asks 
children to rate the frequency of parents’ fear-enhancing 
behaviors, using a 4-point Likert scale (0 = never, 1 = some-
times, 2 = often, and 3 = always). The questionnaire consists 
1 The finding that the drop-outs were significantly older probably has 
to do with the fact that the older children were in transition from pri-
mary to secondary school at the time of the second follow-up assess-
ment. It was no longer possible to test these children ‘live’ at school, 
but they were asked to complete the measurements via the internet. 
Note that we adjusted for age (and gender) in the statistical analy-
ses, so it is unlikely that this had a significant impact on the obtained 
results.
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of 14 items: 6 items are concerned with modeling behav-
iors of parents (e.g., “This parent shows me that he/she is 
afraid to do certain things”), while 8 items have to do with 
threat information transmission (e.g., “This parent warns me 
explicitly that I should avoid dangerous situations”). Each 
item is answered twice, once for the mother and once for the 
father. For each parent, PEAC modeling and threat infor-
mation transmission scores are computed by summing the 
ratings on relevant items. In the current study, Cronbach’s 
alphas of the modeling scale for mothers and fathers varied 
between 0.65 and 0.84 on various assessment points, while 
alphas of the threat information scale ranged between 0.80 
and 0.92. These values indicate that the PEAC scales have 
sufficient to good reliability in terms of internal consistency.
The parent version of the PEAC (PEAC-P) is similar to 
the questionnaire that is completed by the children, but the 
14 items are formulated from the perspective of the parent 
(e.g., “I warn my child explicitly that he/she should avoid 
dangerous situations” instead of “This parent warns me 
explicitly that I should avoid dangerous situations”). Cron-
bach’s alphas of the PEAC-P modeling scale for mothers 
and fathers varied between 0.63 and 0.78, while alphas of 
the threat information scale ranged between 0.73 and 0.83. 
These values indicate that the internal consistency of the 
PEAC-P is similar to that of the child version.
The Revised version of the Screen for Child Anxiety 
Related Emotional Disorders (SCARED-R; [41]) is an 
extension of the original SCARED [42]. The scale assesses 
symptoms of the entire spectrum of DSM-IV-defined anxiety 
disorders [43, 44]. In the current study only the SCARED-R 
subscales of social phobia (7 items; e.g., “I don’t like to be 
with unfamiliar people”), generalized anxiety disorder (9 
items; e.g., “I worry about things working out for me”), and 
separation anxiety disorder (8 items; e.g., “I don’t like being 
away from my family”) were used, because these three types 
of anxiety were considered as most relevant in relation to 
the scenarios that were employed to assess cognitive biases 
(see below). Children were asked to rate the frequency 
with which they experienced each symptom using a three-
point scale (0 = almost never, 1 = sometimes, 2 = often) and 
a total anxiety score was obtained by summing ratings on 
the items of the three selected anxiety scales (range 0–48). 
Research has demonstrated that the SCARED-R has good 
internal consistency, test–retest reliability, and validity [41, 
45, 46]. In the present study, the internal consistency of the 
SCARED-R total anxiety score was excellent, with Cron-
bach’s alphas of 0.87, 0.88 and 0.90 on the three successive 
time points.
The information search task (IST) was based on the para-
digm used by Remmerswaal et al. [17] and adjusted for the 
purpose of the current study to assess children’s confirma-
tion bias. The adjustments to the IST entailed that the stories 
described real-life situations that reflected social, separation, 
and general anxiety themes instead of stories involving a 
novel animal, which were employed by Remmerswaal et al. 
[17]. Children were presented with new, potentially threat-
ening situations (e.g., going to a new school) about which 
they had to gain additional information (e.g., “What would 
you like to know about the teachers at your new school?”) 
by choosing between a positive (e.g., “Whether they have a 
nice way of teaching”) and a negative (e.g., “Whether they 
become angry very easily”) option. Following their choice, 
children always received a confirming response (e.g., posi-
tive: “Most teachers have a nice way of teaching”, negative: 
“Most teachers become angry very easily”). In total, children 
were presented with three situations (one per anxiety theme) 
on each time point, for each of which they were given five 
opportunities to gain extra information. A confirmation bias 
score was computed for each time point by summing the 
number of negative options chosen (range 0–15). The reli-
ability in terms of internal consistency of the IST proved to 
be satisfactory in this study, with Cronbach’s alphas of 0.75, 
0.81, and 0.80 on the three time points.
Ambiguous stories [13, 47] were used to assess interpre-
tation bias. These stories represented the themes of social 
anxiety (e.g., going to a sporting club for the first time), gen-
eralized anxiety (e.g., driving with your bike on a very busy 
street), and separation anxiety (e.g., staying with a friend 
while parents are on vacation). Children had to read the sto-
ries, which consisted of five sentences presented to them 
sentence by sentence on the computer screen. An example 
of a story relating to the theme of generalized anxiety would 
be: “You ride on the bike slowly because you are carrying a 
large bag with purchases. You ride on a street without a bike-
way. It is a very busy street. The cars that pass you by drive 
very fast. You hear a big truck approaching from behind 
(see [13, 47]). Following each sentence, children were asked 
whether they thought that the story would ultimately be 
“scary” or “not scary”. On each time point, children were 
presented with three different stories (again one for each of 
the three anxiety themes). A total interpretation bias score 
was calculated for each time point by summing the number 
of sentences after which children indicated that the story 
was going to be scary (range 0–15). The reliability in terms 
of internal consistency of the Ambiguous Stories test was 
good, with Cronbach’s alphas of 0.79, 0.81, and 0.81 on the 
three consecutive time points.
Procedure
Participants were recruited via four primary schools in the 
Southern part of The Netherlands. Informed parental consent 
was obtained by sending parents an information letter about 
the study along with a consent form. Children for whom 
parents granted permission were tested in small groups (of 
approximately eight children per group) in a separate room 
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at school. Each child used a computer to fill out the question-
naires (PEAC and SCARED-R) and to conduct the cognitive 
bias tasks. This assessment took place under supervision 
of two experimenters, who guided the children through the 
session by providing instructions and by collectively con-
ducting some practice items. Children received explicit 
instructions to call upon the experimenters in case they had 
any questions about the scales or tasks. The experimenters 
remained always present during the assessments to ensure 
that the children worked independently and completed all 
questionnaire and test items. Children first completed the 
SCARED and the PEAC, after which they carried out the 
IST and the Ambiguous Stories test. Parents completed 
the questionnaire at home on their own computer using a 
web-link provided to them by the experimenters. Follow-up 
assessments were conducted on two time points, 6 and 12 
months after the initial assessment session. Children who 
were in the last grade of primary school when the study 
started, had already left school at the time that the 12 month 
follow-up assessment took place. These children received an 
e-mail that included an internet link which enabled them to 
carry out the final assessment at home.
Statistical Analyses
Descriptive statistics and correlations were computed to 
inspect cross-sectional and longitudinal links among all vari-
ables that were measured in the study. Further, the presence 
of differences among the four participating schools with 
respect to the mean scores of various variables on the three 
time points was checked by repeated measures analyses of 
variance (ANOVAs), with school as between-subject factor 
and time as within-subject factor. Data were further analyzed 
by means of structural equations modeling using LISREL 
8.80 [48, 49]. For all children the child-reported PEAC data 
of the mother and father were averaged, and this procedure 
seemed justified as scores for both parents were substantially 
correlated (i.e., r’s were respectively 0.70 for modeling and 
0.83 for threat information transmission on time point 1, 
0.60 and 0.80 on time point 2, and 0.57 and 0.78 on time 
point 3, all p’s < 0.001). Further, preliminary regression 
analyses showed that child-reported mother and father PEAC 
scores displayed similar relations with children’s cognitive 
biases and anxiety symptoms. Confirmation and interpreta-
tion bias were analyzed separately in the model, since they 
were not particularly strongly correlated (r = 0.20 on time 
point 1, r = 0.28 on time point 2, and r = 0.36 on time point 
3, all p’s < 0.01). Moreover, it can be assumed that there is 
a logical temporal order for both biases, with interpretation 
bias being the starting point of conscious threat perception 
and confirmation bias constituting a cognitive response 
occurring once threat has been perceived. Age and sex were 
included as exogenous variables in all models as previous 
research has indicated that these may have an effect on child-
hood anxiety symptoms (and possibly related psychological 
constructs): that is, anxiety symptoms tend to decline as chil-
dren become older and girls generally display higher levels 
of anxiety symptoms than boys [50–52].
A four-step procedure was followed for the LISREL anal-
yses. First, we conducted a series of analyses to explore the 
direction of the relations between child anxiety, confirmation 
bias, and interpretation bias on each of the three time points. 
To this end we tested a number of theoretically plausible 
models: First, we tested a model with arrows pointing from 
both (correlated) biases to anxiety (model 1; see Table 3 of 
the results section for a graphical overview of all the mod-
els). We also tested a model with arrows pointing in the 
opposite direction (model 2), which essentially assumes that 
both (correlated) biases are the result of anxiety. Another 
plausible model that was tested was a circular model, since 
we know from previous research that cognitive bias and 
anxiety influence each other reciprocally [17]. In this cir-
cular model (model 3) interpretation bias was placed before 
confirmation bias, since—as noted above—interpretation 
and perception of threat is likely to occur before one can 
search for confirming or disconfirming information. Another 
model resembled model 1, by assuming that anxiety is the 
result of both biases, but here interpretation bias preceded 
confirmation bias (model 4). In a similar vein, a further 
model was tested as a variant of model 2, with both biases 
being the result of anxiety and interpretation bias preceding 
confirmation bias (model 5). A final model hypothesized 
that anxiety, interpretation bias, and confirmation bias were 
all inter-correlated with no clear-cut directions among these 
three variables (model 6). All models were tested twice, 
once without and once with equality constraints. Testing 
without equality constraints means that every causal path at 
every time point has its own regression weight, whereas in 
the analyses with equality constraints it was assumed that 
the path coefficients were stable over the three time points 
for any given causal path, such as from interpretation bias 
to anxiety (thereby reducing the number of path coefficients 
and making the model more parsimonious). In each of these 
models a residual correlation was included between the three 
repeated measures of the same variable (e.g., between anxi-
ety at time 1, 2 and 3).
As a second step, the best fitting model was tested lon-
gitudinally by adding time-lagged paths between the three 
variables across the three time points, for instance between 
cognitive biases on one time point (t) and anxiety symp-
toms on a subsequent time point (t + 1) and between anxi-
ety symptoms on t and biases on t + 1. Third, the parenting 
variables (PEAC modeling and threat information transmis-
sion) were added in order to test the cross-sectional rela-
tions between the parenting variables on the one hand and 
anxiety and both biases on the other hand. Fourth, again the 
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best fitting model was tested longitudinally by adding time-
lagged paths between parenting and child variables. Further 
details of all models will be given in the “Results” section.
Model fit was assessed by means of the following good-
ness-of-fit indices: the Chi Square test, the root mean square 
of approximation (RMSEA), the normed fit index (NFI), the 
non-normed fit index (NNFI), and the comparative fit index 
(CFI). Apart from the first measure, all measures combine 
goodness of fit (Chi Square) with model parsimony (degrees 
of freedom). For the RMSEA, lower values are indicative 
of a better fit and values of 0.05 and 0.08 can be considered 
as respectively good and reasonable [53]. The NFI, NNFI, 
and CFI range between 0 (poor) and 1 (excellent), and for 
these indices values thus need to be large, with 0.90 being 
the cut-off for defining a good fit.
Results
Mean Differences and Correlations Among 
Parenting, Biases, and Anxiety
Table 1 displays the mean scores and standard deviations for 
various child-completed measures as obtained on the three 
time points as well as the cross-sectional and longitudinal 
correlations among these variables. Apart from the finding 
that longitudinal associations between different variables 
were in general weaker than cross-sectional relations, a num-
ber of conclusions can be drawn from this table. To begin 
with, test–retest correlations varied between 0.56 and 0.70 
(p’s < 0.01) for anxiety symptoms, 0.42 and 0.61 (p’s < 0.01) 
for confirmation bias, 0.42 and 0.50 (p’s < 0.01) for interpre-
tation bias, 0.41 and 0.50 (p’s < 0.01) for parental modeling, 
and 0.44 and 0.55 (p’s < 0.01) for parental threat informa-
tion transmission. Repeated measures ANOVAs showed that 
there was no effect of school for any of the variables (all 
p’s > 0.05). A significant time effect was found with regard 
to anxiety scores [F(2, 430) = 10.28, p < .001, ηρ2 = 0.05]. 
Post-hoc tests showed that children’s anxiety scores signifi-
cantly decreased from time point 1 to time point 2 (p = 0.01), 
with no significant change being observed from time 2 to 
time 3 (p = 0.11). A repeated measures ANOVA for con-
firmation bias also revealed a significant time effect [F(2, 
430) = 32.91, p < 0.001, ηρ2 = 0.13]. Post-hoc tests revealed 
a significant decrease from time 1 to time 2 (p < 0.001), 
while there was a significant increase from time 2 to time 3 
(p < 0.001). The repeated measures ANOVAs with interpre-
tation bias, parental modeling, and threat information trans-
mission as dependent variables did not show significant time 
effects (all p’s > 0.05). Further, it was found that children’s 
anxiety symptoms were significantly correlated with cogni-
tive biases and parenting variables on all three time points 
(r’s between 0.30 and 0.51, p’s < 0.01). Finally, although 
cognitive biases were as expected positively associated with 
modeling and threat information transmission, these correla-
tions were modest and sometimes even non-significant (r’s 
between 0.10, p > 0.05 and 0.29, p’s < 0.01).
Correlations of the Parent‑Report Data
In Table 2, an overview is given of the correlations between 
the PEAC scales as completed by the parents and both biases 
and anxiety as reported by the child. In general, these cross-
informant correlations were weak and in most cases non-
significant. The one exception was the correlation between 
parent-reported modeling and child-reported anxiety symp-
toms on time 2 (r = 0.20, p = 0.02). Given these findings, we 
decided to discard the parent data and merely focused on the 
child-report data in the remainder of the analyses.
In passing, it should be noted that the parent–child cor-
relations for the PEAC scales were also very low. For mod-
eling, these correlations were 0.16 (p = 0.06) on time 1, 0.06 
(p = 0.49) on time 2, and 0.21 (p = 0.01) on time 3. For threat 
information transmission, the correlations between parents 
and children were 0.16 (p = 0.05), 0.16 (p = 0.05), and 0.07 
(p = 0.42) on the three subsequent time points.
Cross‑Sectional Models of the Relations Among 
Cognitive Biases and Anxiety
As can be seen in Table 3, the results indicated that models 
3 and 5 provided the best fit for the cross-sectional relations 
among interpretation bias, confirmation bias, and anxiety. In 
the circular model (model 3), anxiety promoted interpreta-
tion bias, which had an enhancing effect on confirmation 
bias, which in turn again increased the level of anxiety. In 
model 5, both biases were the result of anxiety, with inter-
pretation bias preceding confirmation bias. All models were 
subsequently re-run with equality constraints, that is, under 
the assumption that the path coefficient from X to Y is the 
same on all three time points for any given pair of variables 
X,Y (thereby reducing the number of path coefficients from 
18 to 6 for the effects of age and gender on anxiety and 
biases in all models, from 9 to 3 for the paths among anxi-
ety and both biases in models 3, 4, and 5, and from 6 to 2 
for those paths in models 1 and 2). Likelihood Ratio (LR) 
testing of each constrained model against its unconstrained 
counterpart confirmed the validity of the equality constraints 
(see Table 3, the LR test uses the difference in Chi Square 
between both models as chi square test statistic, and the dif-
ference in degrees of freedom as the df for the LR test). 
Examination of the fit measures showed that models 3 and 5 
again provided the best fit for the data. Because the circular 
model with bidirectional relations from bias to anxiety and 
vice versa (model 3) makes theoretically more sense [17] 
than a model in which biases are only by-products of anxiety 
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(model 5), we chose model 3 with equality constraints as the 
starting point for further analyses.
Longitudinal Model of the Relations Among 
Cognitive Biases and Anxiety
The following four extensions of model 3 with longitudinal 
paths were tested against model 3 with LR tests: (a) Time-
lagged paths from both biases to anxiety; (b) Time-lagged 
paths from anxiety to both biases; (c) A combination of 
time-lagged paths from both biases to anxiety as well as 
time-lagged paths from anxiety to both biases; and (d) The 
same time-lagged paths as cross-sectional paths, that is, 
from anxiety to interpretation bias, from interpretation bias 
to confirmation bias, and from confirmation bias to anxi-
ety. None of these four model extensions with time-lagged 
paths provided a better fit than model 3 with cross-sectional 
paths between the three constructs and residual correlations 
between the repeated measurements of a given constructs 
(i.e., anxiety, interpretation bias, confirmation bias). In all 
cases, the change in Chi Square was very close to the change 
in degrees of freedom and thus non-significant. Given the 
already very good fit of model 3 (see Table 3), this did not 
come as a complete surprise. Figure 1 shows the longitudinal 
version of model 3 including children’s anxiety and cogni-
tive biases variables as measured on the three consecutive 
time points.
Final model with parenting variables
The effects of the parenting variables of modeling and 
threat information transmission were first explored cross-
sectionally by adding relations between parenting variables 
to the best fitting, theoretically most meaningful model (i.e., 
model 3) on each of the three time points. Three variants 
were tested: (a) A model in which parenting variables had 
an effect on anxiety and both cognitive biases; (b) A reversed 
model in which anxiety and cognitive biases had an impact 
on both parenting variables; and (c) A third and final model 
with bidirectional relations between parenting variables on 
the one hand and anxiety and cognitive biases on the other 
hand. In all three models we also assumed a cross-sectional 
correlation between modeling and threat information trans-
mission as well as longitudinal correlations between the 
repeated measures of any given variable (e.g., between 
modeling at t and t + 1), and again we imposed equality 
constraints on all three paths for a given pair of variables 
(e.g., on the paths from modeling to anxiety at t1, t2, and t3).
Model C with bidirectional relations between parenting 
and anxiety/cognitive biases gave warnings and did not con-
verge (probably due to unidentifiability). Model B with paths 
from anxiety and cognitive biases towards parenting vari-
ables had a better fit (χ2 = 169.76, df = 98, RMSEA = 0.05, 
NFI = 0.93, NNFI = 0.96, CFI = 0.97) than model A with 
paths from parenting variables to anxiety and cognitive 
biases (χ2 = 199.00, df = 98, RMSEA = 0.06, NFI = 0.92, 
NNFI = 0.94, CFI = 0.96).
Extending model B with time-lagged paths from child to 
parenting variables or vice versa (e.g., from threat informa-
tion transmission at t to anxiety at t + 1) did not improve the 
model fit and revealed no significant time-lagged effects. 
The best final model is therefore the model depicted in 
Fig. 2, with equality constraints and thus stability over time 
of all path coefficients.
Mediation model
Note that we did not formally test a model in which cognitive 
biases acted as mediators in the relation between parental 
variables and children’s anxiety symptoms. We considered 
testing such a model as no longer appropriate, because we 
obtained no convincing evidence for a unidirectional relation 
between cognitive biases and anxiety (see Table 3).
Discussion
The aim of the current study was to investigate associations 
among fear-enhancing parenting behaviors (modeling and 
threat information transmission), cognitive biases (interpre-
tation bias and confirmation bias), and anxiety symptoms 
Table 2  Correlations among the parent-reported PEAC scales and the 
child-reported anxiety and cognitive biases scores
SCARED-R Screen for child anxiety related disorders-revised, IST 
information search task, C-bias confirmation bias, Amb Stories 
ambiguous stories, I-bias interpretation bias, PEAC parental enhance-
ment of anxious cognitions, Threat threat information transmission
N = 147







 SCARED-R Anxiety 0.04 0.13
 IST C-bias − 0.02 0.14
 Amb Stories I-bias 0.04 0.02
Time 2
 SCARED-R Anxiety 0.20* 0.10
 IST C-bias 0.04 0.08
 Amb Stories I-bias 0.00 − 0.03
Time 3
 SCARED-R Anxiety 0.06 − 0.02
 IST C-bias − 0.05 0.04
 Amb Stories I-bias − 0.05 − 0.11
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in non-clinical children, using a longitudinal study design 
consisting of three time points. Structural equation mod-
eling by means of LISREL was employed to first test vari-
ous models assuming only cross-sectional relations, and 
varying the direction of the paths among child anxiety, 
interpretation bias, and confirmation bias. Next, the best 
fitting, theoretically most plausible model was extended 
with longitudinal (cross-lagged) paths between anxiety and 
both biases. Finally, the parenting variables were added to 
the model. The key findings of the study can be catalogued 
as follows. First, we found support for a circular model in 
which cognitive biases promoted anxiety symptoms, which 
in turn enhanced cognitive biases. Second, no evidence was 
obtained for longitudinal effects indicating that cognitive 
biases increased anxiety levels or that anxiety strengthened 
cognitive biases over time. Third, the effects regarding fear-
enhancing parenting were not completely as anticipated: the 
data suggested that cognitive biases and anxiety promoted 
modeling and negative information transmission rather than 
the other way around. Based on a previous cross-sectional 
analysis of these data (collected on time point 1; [39]) and 
current theoretical notions [28], we also expected to find 
Table 3  The six tested structural models of the cross-sectional relations among interpretation bias, confirmation bias, and anxiety symptoms on 
the three consecutive time points









































































The upper rows show the results of the analyses conducted without equality constraints and the lower rows the results of the analyses with equal-
ity constraints. N = 216. One-way arrows reflect hypothesized to causal relations, while two-way arrows indicate correlation instead of effect. In 
all models, age and gender were included as exogenous variables having an effect on all psychological variables, and residual covariances were 
included between the repeated measures of a given psychological variable
C-bias confirmation bias, I-bias interpretation bias, df degrees of freedom, RMSEA root mean square of approximation, NFI Normed Fit Index, 
NNFI Non-normed Fit Index, CFI Comparative Fit Index
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Fig. 1  The best fitting model with circular relations among cognitive 
biases and anxiety on each of the three time points including residual 
correlations between the three repeated measurements of the same 
variable. Standardized path coefficients and residual correlations are 
shown. C-bias confirmation bias, I-bias interpretation bias. Equality 
constraints apply to unstandardized path coefficients. Standardized 
coefficients are not exactly equal across time points due to changes in 
variance of anxiety, C-bias, and I-bias over time. Age and gender are 
not displayed in the figure, although they were entered as exogenous 
variables with an effect on all psychological variables in the model
Fig. 2  The best fitting model with circular relations among cognitive 
biases and anxiety on each of the three time points as well as paths 
from biases and anxiety towards both PEAC subscales. Standardized 
path coefficients are shown as well as residual correlations between 
the three repeated measures of the same PEAC variable and between 
modeling and threat information transfer at the same time point. 
C-bias confirmation bias, I-bias interpretation bias, mod modeling, 
threat threat information transmission. Equality constraints hold for 
the unstandardized path coefficients, but not for the residual vari-
ances, and thereby not exactly for the standardized path coefficients. 
Age and gender are not displayed in the figure, although they were 
entered as exogenous variables with an effect on all psychological 
variables in the model. For clarity reasons, non-significant paths as 
well as the residual correlations that are included in Fig.  1 are not 
shown in the figure, although they were included into the model
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support for a longitudinal mediational model in which cog-
nitive biases would act as connector (mediator) between 
fear-enhancing parenting behaviors and children’s anxiety 
symptoms. However, the present findings indicated that 
there appeared to be reciprocal relations between cognitive 
biases and child anxiety and that child anxiety had an impact 
on parenting variables rather than the other way around. For 
these reasons, we considered tests of the hypothesized medi-
tational model as no longer justifiable.
The analyses showed that children’s anxiety symptoms 
were significantly and positively associated with interpre-
tation and confirmation bias on each of three assessment 
occasions. This is well in line with previous studies showing 
that anxious children display a stronger tendency to interpret 
ambiguous situations in a threatening way [12–14] and are 
more inclined to search for information that confirms threat 
[17–20]. LISREL analyses modeling the direction of the 
relations among anxiety and both biases revealed accept-
able fits for most models. However, there were two models 
that stood out and displayed the best goodness-of-fit values 
across various fit indices. In one model, there was a unidirec-
tional link from anxiety symptoms to both types of cognitive 
biases, whereas the other model was circular in nature with a 
bidirectional relation between anxiety and biases. Although 
there is certainly evidence showing that anxiety can pre-
cede the occurrence of cognitive biases, a wide range of 
studies have also demonstrated a reversed scenario in which 
these biases come first and contribute to the development 
of anxiety symptoms (see reviews by [54, 55]). A recent 
investigation by Remmerswaal et al. [17] demonstrated that 
in children such a bidirectional relation between cognitive 
biases and anxiety is also applicable, and for this reason we 
consider the circular, bidirectional model as theoretically 
more plausible than the model in which biases are just a 
by-product of anxiety.
An additional remark concerns the relation between cog-
nitive biases and anxiety. The best fitting models had in com-
mon that there was a temporal order for both cognitive biases 
in which interpretation bias preceded confirmation bias. This 
sequence makes sense because interpretation bias describes 
the process of transforming a neutral or even an apparently 
positive event into a dangerous one and as such is typically 
considered to be the starting point of conscious threat per-
ception [9]. In contrast, confirmation bias only occurs after 
threat has been perceived: the individual perceives the dan-
ger and subsequently searches for further information that 
confirms this threat [18].
In contrast to the support for relations between anxiety 
and cognitive biases, no cross-lagged, longitudinal relations 
were found. That is, no indications were found showing that 
(a) anxiety symptoms increased cognitive biases on sub-
sequent time points, or that (b) cognitive biases enhanced 
anxiety symptoms over time. These results are in keeping 
with Muris et al. [56] who also failed to document prospec-
tive links between interpretation bias and children’s anxiety 
symptoms, but are obviously in contrast with Dodd et al. 
[57] who did show that threat interpretation predicted anxi-
ety symptoms at a 12-month follow-up, and Creswell and 
O’Connor [58] who noted that anxiety symptoms predicted 
change in interpretation bias over time. Given these incon-
sistent findings, one might conclude that the contribution of 
cognitive biases occurring during the later stages of informa-
tion processing, such as interpretation bias and confirmation 
bias, do not play a prominent role in the development of 
childhood anxiety symptoms. However, as the research so 
far has been mainly focused on young people in primary and 
middle childhood, it is still possible that this conclusion is 
only appropriate for early developmental stages and that the 
contribution of these cognitive biases to anxiety pathology 
becomes more important during adolescence and adulthood 
[59]. Obviously, replication of the present study in a sample 
of older youth is necessary to further investigate this pos-
sibility. Furthermore, it would be interesting to explore the 
link between cognitive biases and anxiety in young people 
who face a stressful life event or in at-risk children and ado-
lescents of parents with anxiety disorders. As described in 
the introduction, previous research has shown that especially 
the offspring of parents with PD are more likely to show 
an interpretation bias [37, 38], and it would be particularly 
relevant to explore whether parental modeling and threat 
information transmission are involved in the familial trans-
mission of this cognitive susceptibility.
Our analyses also showed substantial stability for both 
the cognitive biases and anxiety symptoms across the three 
assessment points. This means that the inter-individual vari-
ation in anxiety symptoms and associated cognitive biases 
did not show substantial changes during the year that the 
children were followed. The most important practical impli-
cation of this finding is that there seems to be a reliably 
identifiable subgroup of children with continuing high levels 
of anxiety symptoms that also show the typical concomitant 
cognitive features of this type of psychopathology (see also 
[60, 61]). It seems likely that these children are prone to 
develop a full-blown anxiety disorder when confronted with 
stress and adversity [62]. They probably constitute a suit-
able target population for prevention and early intervention 
efforts [4].
With regard to the parental variables of modeling and 
threat information transmission, our main prediction was 
that these parenting behaviors would enhance children’s 
anxiety symptoms and cognitive biases. The results first of 
all indicated that a model in which the parenting variables 
of modeling and threat information transmission had an 
enhancing effect on children’s anxiety symptoms and asso-
ciated biases fitted the data rather well. However, the struc-
tural equations modeling analyses also revealed that a model 
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in which anxiety symptoms and cognitive biases promoted 
fear-enhancing parental behaviors even had a slightly bet-
ter fit. In view of these findings, a model with bidirectional 
relations between fear-enhancing parenting behaviors and 
children’s anxiety symptoms/cognitive biases seemed most 
plausible, but unfortunately that model appeared to be uni-
dentifiable. Altogether, these results warrant the conclusion 
that a scenario in which anxiety symptoms and cognitive 
biases in children elicit anxious parenting is at least as likely 
as one in which fear-enhancing parenting elicits cognitive 
biases and anxiety. In the literature, several scholars have 
noted that fear-enhancing parental behaviors such as mod-
eling and threat information transmission may intensify cog-
nitive biases and anxiety symptoms in young people [32], 
but at the same time it is also possible that fear and anxiety 
symptomatology in children will evoke this type of parental 
behaviors in an attempt to help youngsters to face potentially 
threatening stimili and situations [40]. Meanwhile, it should 
be kept in mind that the above described findings regarding 
the role of parenting were mainly based on the analysis of 
children’s self-report data. It is possible that high-anxious 
children more easily perceive fear-promoting behaviors in 
their parents, which could also reflect some type of cogni-
tive bias.
The present study also yielded a number of additional 
findings that need to be briefly discussed. First of all, for 
some variables, a significant gender effect was documented. 
In keeping with the literature, girls displayed higher levels 
of anxiety symptoms and interpretation bias than boys [51, 
52]. Second, age was negatively related to anxiety symp-
toms and cognitive biases [50, 63, 64]. Thus, with increas-
ing age, children reported lower levels of anxiety symptoms 
and indicated decreased tendencies to interpret ambiguous 
situation as threatening (interpretation bias) and to search 
for information that confirms threat (confirmation bias). 
Given that there are no reasons to assume that the relations 
between anxiety, cognitive biases, and parenting are different 
for boys and girls, and the fact that we only included young 
people of middle childhood with a limited age range, we did 
not explore moderation effects of gender and age but rather 
controlled for these demographic variables in our analyses.
A strong point of this study was that we tested cross-
sectional as well as time-lagged relations between anxiety 
symptoms, cognitive biases, and parenting variables, even-
tually selecting the model that was the best compromise 
between goodness of fit (not lacking any relevant and signifi-
cant paths or correlations) and parsimony (imposing sensi-
ble equality constraints). However, the present investigation 
also suffers from a number of limitations. To begin with, 
the study focused on a limited set of variables (modeling, 
threat information transmission, cognitive biases) that might 
be relevant within the etiology of childhood anxiety prob-
lems, thereby neglecting other factors (e.g., temperament, 
conditioning, overprotective parenting, and insecure attach-
ment, or even protective factors) that are involved in the 
development of this type of psychopathology [65]. Second, 
although we did include parent rating scales and children’s 
self-report measures, most constructs were only assessed 
using one informant (i.e., either child or parent). The meas-
ure that was administered to children and parents (PEAC 
questionnaire) did not yield fully converging results, and this 
highlights the importance of including multiple informants 
for all variables [66]. Third, although an attempt was made 
to include both parents in the study, the participation rate 
was clearly higher for mothers than for fathers. As we used 
averaged parent scores if both parents had participated, or 
the scores of the one available parent else, it should be borne 
in mind that mothers were overrepresented in the present 
data set. Fourth, parenting was only assessed via a rating 
scale; it would have been better if we had employed some 
kind of interview or observational method to assess the 
fear-enhancing parental behaviors of modeling and threat 
information transmission. Apart from the fact that such a 
multi-method approach is preferable, this would also give 
us the opportunity to study the validity of the PEAC more 
thoroughly. Fifth, the study was carried out with a sample 
of non-clinical young people in middle childhood, a devel-
opmental stage with fairly little socio-emotional turmoil. It 
would be interesting to conduct a similar study in clinically 
referred youth or children/adolescents who face a significant 
life event. Sixth, children’s PEAC scores for mothers and 
fathers were strongly correlated, which may be the result 
of the method of scoring each item simultaneously for both 
parents (father ratings had to be provided on the left side 
of the screen, while mothers were given on the right side). 
For future studies, it would be better to present the father 
and mother versions of this questionnaire serially instead 
of employing this type of parallel assessment. Finally, the 
task for measuring interpretation bias included only three 
vignettes (i.e., one vignette per anxiety type: i.e., social 
anxiety, generalized anxiety, and separation anxiety) on 
each time point, and so one could question the validity of 
this task. However, it is important to note that this bias was 
not assessed by only three items as each vignette actually 
contained 5 items. This means that the interpretation bias 
scores, and this was also true for confirmation bias scores, 
were based on a total of 15 items, a number which was con-
sidered as more than sufficient for measuring these anxi-
ety-related constructs. Moreover, for practical reasons, the 
administration of more vignettes was not desirable because 
this would have substantially increased the overall testing 
time for the children.
In spite of these limitations, this study yields important 
information on the cross-sectional and prospective relations 
between parenting, cognitive biases, and childhood anxiety. 
While the longitudinal analysis provided no support for the 
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idea that cognitive biases are important for the etiology of 
childhood anxiety disorders, the data at least showed that 
these biases were solid correlates of anxiety and may fuel 
symptoms on each time point separately. This means that 
cognitive biases may indeed be a feasible target for inter-
ventions that aim to decrease anxiety levels in children, 
an idea that is of course already widespread in cognitive 
behavior therapy (CBT; [67]). Besides regular cognitive 
restructuring, an alternative option would be to apply bias 
modification approaches [68, 69] to undermine the cognitive 
biases to ultimately decrease the anxiety level. With regard 
to parenting, implications for therapy are less clear-cut: it 
seems common sense that parents should try not to increase 
their offspring’s anxiety symptoms by continuously mod-
eling fear reactions or by constant communication of threat 
information. In the meantime, we should not overrate the 
importance of these parenting behaviors for the maintenance 
of children’s anxiety symptoms as they may just as likely 
be a reaction of the parents to an already anxious child. In 
support of this line of reasoning is the treatment literature 
which generally shows that adding parental components to 
CBT for anxious children does not necessarily imply that 
the intervention will be more effective [70]. Taken together, 
this research challenges a number of common assumptions 
on the etiology of childhood anxiety that are certainly a topic 
of further inquiry.
Summary
Threat-related cognitive biases as well as fear-enhancing 
parenting behaviors are assumed to be involved in the etiol-
ogy and maintenance of anxiety pathology in children. This 
longitudinal study explored whether (1) parental modeling 
and threat information transmission would be positively 
related to anxiety symptoms in children, and (2) if this rela-
tionship was mediated by children’s cognitive biases. On 
three subsequent time points over a one-year period, 7- to 
12-year-old children and parents completed the Parental 
Enhancement of Anxious Cognitions scale, which meas-
ures parental modeling and threat information transmission, 
while children also completed a questionnaire of anxiety 
disorders symptoms and two computerized tasks measuring 
confirmation and interpretation bias. Results indicated that 
relations between cognitive biases and children’s anxiety 
symptoms were circular in nature. Thus, cognitive biases 
appeared to enhance anxiety symptoms, which in turn pro-
moted cognitive biases on each of the three time points. 
No evidence was found for longitudinal effects of cogni-
tive biases on anxiety or vice versa. The findings regard-
ing the fear-enhancing parenting behaviors did not confirm 
our a priori hypothesis: cognitive biases and anxiety were 
found to promote parental modeling and threat information 
rather than the other way around. Because of these results, 
the mediation analysis of cognitive biases in the relation 
between fear-enhancing parenting and children’s anxiety 
symptoms was no longer justifiable. These findings provide 
further insight in the role of fear-enhancing parenting behav-
iors and cognitive biases in childhood anxiety.
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